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THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW DIMENSIONS 
OF THE UFFI PROBLEM: PART II* 
David Coherrt 
3. Public Law Dimensions 
The decentralized and unstructured decision-making process 
leading to the inclusion of UFFI in the federally financed home 
insulation programme suggests that the question whether the 
federal government is responsible in law for the injuries allegedly 
suffered by Canadian homeowners and their families is not easily 
answered. The liability of the federal government must first be 
analyzed in terms of the various individual government employees 
for whose activities the federal government or  Crown corpora- 
tions may be vicariously responsible, and in terms of an analysis 
of the Crown corporations for whose activities the federal 
government may be responsible. In addition, the question as to 
governmental liability must, to a very large degree, depend upon 
the nature of the activity (or failure to act) which is being 
addressed. It is possible to identify several acts of the federal 
government, acting through its employees, and of Crown 
corporations, acting through their boards or employees, which 
may be reviewed by the courts: 
(1) the decision of Cabinet in enacting regulations delegating 
financial and material acceptance authority over the home 
insulation programmes to C.M.H.C. ; 
(2) the decision of C.M.H.C. to issue "acceptance" numbers to 
specific UFFI manufacturers in the summer of 1977, in the 
absence of an application standard, and without an effective 
policing or  enforcement mechanism to ensure the quality of 
the installed insulation; 
(3) the decision of the Department of Supply and Services, acting 
through the C.G.S.B. to establish a product standard for 
For Part I of this paper see 8 C.B.L.J. 309 (1983-84). 
Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. 
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UFFI insulation, which apparently failed to consider any 
potential hazards to health associated with use of the foam; 
(4) the failure of C.M.H.C., the Department of Supply and 
Services, and the Department of Energy, Mines and 
Resources acting through the Office of Energy Conservation, 
to warn potential users of the risks to health and safety 
associated with use of the product; 
(5) the negligent representation of the acceptable quality of the 
product by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources 
in its energy conservation information programme, and by 
C.M.H.C. through its issuance of acceptance numbers to 
particular manufacturers; and 
(6) the failure of the National Research Council to engage in 
adequate research and literature searches to ensure that its 
advice to the C.G.S.B. reflected all available information 
regarding the product. 
The jurisdiction of the courts to impose liability on the federal 
government is founded in federal legislation - the Crown 
Liability which permits the court to find the state vicari- 
ously liable for the torts committed by its servants or agents.232 
The attention of the court must be focussed on individual rather 
than bureaucratic b e h a ~ i o u r . ~ ~ ~  Thus in any discussion of the 
potential liability of the federal government, the point of judicial 
inquiry will be the identification of a tort committed either by an 
individual federal employee or by a Crown corporation for whose 
acts the federal government is liable. The vicarious liability of the 
federal government for the faults of its individual employees 
231 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, as amended. The only amendment to the Act which is relevant to 
this study is the enactment of the wiretap provisions of the Criminal Code, and the 
related amendment of the Crown Liability Act which renders the state liable in 
damages where a servant of the Crown intentionally interrupts a private communi- 
cation in the course of his employment. See Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 
50, s. 4; Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, s. 7.2(1). 
U2 Ibid., ss. 3(l)(a), 4(2). See Sociedad Transoceanica Canopus S.A. ,  Owners of rhe 
Vessel M.S .  Procyon v. National Harbours Board, [I9681 2 E x .  C.R. 330 (B.C. 
Admiralty Dist.). 
233 It should be noted, however, that the vicarious liability of the state can be imposed by 
virtue of the collective acts or omissions of a number of servants whose behaviour 
contributed, albeit in a small way, to the alleged negligent act. See Wilfred Nadeau Inc. 
v. The Queen in right of Canada, [I9771 1 F.C. 541 (T.D.), at p. 545, affd (19801 1 F.C. 
808 (C.A.). 
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reflects an underlying philosophical and institutional perspective 
regarding the judicial imposition of liability on the state. This 
approach does not attribute fault to the state as an abstract 
concept, but to individuals - judicial control, if it is exercised at 
all, is directed at particular government employees, not at the 
public service or  the state i t ~ e l f . ~  The non-liability of the state 
reflects what I have chosen to refer to as a "pure-corrective 
justice model" of judicial decision-making.235 The primary 
element in this theory is the judicial view of the action as a 
dispute - a "one-against-one" conflict - and thus requires the 
individualization of responsibility as reflected in the vicarious 
liability structure of state liability. 
It is my impression that judicial review will take place only 
rarely. First, one has to acknowledge the defendant bias intro- 
duced by the concept of vicarious liability. Second, the juris- 
diction to impose liability on the state, as opposed to the 
jurisdiction to impose liability on a civil servant in his individual 
capacity, is quite and obviously is enjoyed only with the 
u4 Perhaps an intended benefit of the vicarious liability of the state is the creation of 
judicial sympathy for the individual, often well-intentioned, public servant who must 
be found personally liable to the plaintiff(s) before the state can be found vicariously 
liable. See C. Harlow, "Fault Liability in French and English Public Law", 39 Mod. L. 
Rev. 516 (1976), at p. 540; National Association of Attorneys-General, Sovereign 
Immunity, The Liability of the Government and Its Officials, revised ed. (1976), at pp. 
25,26. While some jurisdictions have expressly limited the scope of judicial review, the 
courts themselves will often voluntarily establish limited executive immunity. See 
Evangelical United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 401 P.2d 440 (1965); Weiss v. 
Fote, 167 N.E.2d 63 (1960). 
u5The corrective justice model, as its name implies, focuses on the positions of the 
litigants to restore, if possible, the relationship between the two. I. Englard, "The 
System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory", 10 J. Leg. 
Stud. 27 (1981); S. Jorgensen, "Liability and Fault", 49 Tul. L. Rev. 329 (1975); A. 
Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation", 89 Haw. L.R. 1281 (1976). 
u6The Crown Liability Act, supra, footnote 231, was enacted in 1953 (S.C. 1952-53, c. 
30). One must keep in mind that until quite recently authority of the court to review 
executive decision-making was extremely limited, and to a large extent could be 
exercised only when the executive thought it appropriate. See Petition of Right Act, 
R.S.C. 1970, c. P-12, repealed by R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd Supp.), s. 64(1), proclaimed 
in force August 1, 1972; Crown Procedure Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 89, repealed by 
S.B.C. 1974, c. 24, s. 16(1), proclaimed in force August 1, 1974 (but see s. 16(2)) and 
superseded by the Crown Proceedings Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 24; H. Street, 
Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press, 1953), at 
pp. 1-6; W.P. Kennedy, "Suits by and Against the Crown", 6 Can. Bar Rev. 329 
(1928); D.P. Jamieson, "Proceedings by and Against the Crown in Canada", 26 Can. 
Bar Rev. 373 (1948); P. Hogg, Liability of the Crown in Australia and New Zealand 
(Melbourne, Law Book Co., 1971). at pp. 2-9. 
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permission of the defendant. The courts are certainly aware of 
the propensity of Legislatures to enact privative clauses to restrict 
judicial review of administrative action in the traditional sense of 
that term. In the case of judicial review of incompetence, the 
openness of the judicial role cannot be disguised in jurisdiction- 
allprocess terms, and thus the risk of legislative retaliation is even 
more acute. The result, it seems, is a deliberate judicial reluc- 
tance to engage in review of anything but the most insignificant 
bureaucratic acts. In addition, the courts may be cognizant that 
even damage awards may have an instrumental effect on bureau- 
cratic behaviour, and that this "primary direct effect" may be 
quite powerful in the case of public Accordingly, the 
courts may be much more sensitive to  the potential instrumental 
effect of their decisions in cases of bureaucratic incompetence 
than would be the case in the development of rules of private 
conduct. 
The final reason for judicial reluctance to act concerns the 
nature of the task in which the courts must engage when 
reviewing bureaucratic incompetence. The decision of the 
executive branch of government which the courts must decide 
was so incompetent as to justify compensation to an injured party 
will almost always involve the exercise of discretion. The 
discretion may range from the establishment of the national 
energy programme - the establishment of priorities, national 
objectives, and massive economic and social programmes 
intended to define and describe the role and function of the state 
in a specific sector of society - to the decision of a building 
inspector to issue a building permit, a decision directly involving 
an individual private citizen. In both cases, and in all cases falling 
between these extremes, the "discretionary decision" is simply a 
statutorily authorized power of decision requiring a choice to be 
made among alternative courses of action in accordance with the 
exercise of judgmer-t by an individual.238 The court's reluctance to 
interfere with discretionary decisions rests on the traditional 
model of judicial decision-making - that the court simply applies 
237 See P. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 3rd ed. (London, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1980), at p. 62. 
See P.  Anisman, Discretion, Law Reform Commission of Canada, Administrative Law 
Project (1975), p. 2; S .A .  de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed. 
(London, Stevens & Sons, 1969), p. 264; Ontario Royal Commission, Inquiry into Civil 
Rights I (1968), p. 30; K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969), p. 4 .  
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positive rules established in earlier cases, to a specific fact situa- 
tion. The legal decision (according to this model) is the result of 
an inexorable (and mechanical) process of logical analy~is .2~~ The 
classic, albeit naive, view, especially in Canada and England, is 
that the exercise of discretion is for the public service, the rule of 
law for the The result is judicial retreat when courts are 
confronted with executive decisions which are clearly based on an 
analysis of political, social, economic or cultural variables (or 
rationalized on that basis). The prior executive or bureaucratic 
activity cannot easily be distorted into a rule-based decision 
which would permit judicial review under the guise of law. To 
acknowledge judicial review of bureaucratic discretion might very 
well be to acknowledge judicial exercise of discretion. For the 
courts to review bureaucratic activity is not only to overstep insti- 
tutional boundaries and risk governmental disapproval, but also 
involves the courts in an activity which they have insisted is 
inappropriate and in which they do not openly admit to 
participating.241 
At the same time, the courts are aware that the bureaucracy 
should not be immune from legal responsibility for its behaviour 
in every case where it injures a member of the public. The 
bureaucracy does not, as a matter of dogma, act in the public 
interest,242 and if one accepts that premise then perhaps there are 
some cases where review is appropriate. As well, the argument 
can be made that the injury suffered by an individual was 
incurred as a result of an activity which benefitted the state, and 
certainly benefitted the public either in terms of an abstract 
239 See P. Russell, "Judicial Power in Canada's Political Culture" in M.L. Friedland, ed., 
C o u m  and Trials: A Multidisciplinary Approach (1975), at pp. 77-9; ~ E .  Hehner, 
"Growth of Discretions - Decline of Accountability" in K. Kernaghan, ed., Public 
Administration in Canada, 3rd ed. (1977), at p. 325. 
240 See Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (1959). "The rule of law is contrasted 
with . . . government based on the exercises of persons in authority of wider arbitrary or  
discretionary powers". See also S. Wexler, "Discretion: The Unacknowledged Side of 
Law", 25 U.T.L.J. 120 (1975), at pp. 121,122; M.R. Cohen, "Rule Versus Discretion" 
in Law and the Social Order (1933), at p. 259. 
z4' Associated with this concern is the converse. If the courts establish themselves as a 
bureaucratic review agency, they may be perceived by the public as a participant in the 
implementation of public policy as defined by the government in power. See Nonet, 
Administrative Justice (1969), at p. 4. 
z42That argument has in fact been made by public authorities. See C.J. Hamson, 
"Escaping Borstel Boys and the Immunity of Office", 27 Camb. L.J. 273 (1969), at p. 
276. 
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social/economic calculus, or directly in terms of reduced 
government contributions. Moreover, institutional limits which 
judges place on themselves should be imposed with the 
knowledge that their decision does not necessarily involve 
second-guessing the bureaucracy, or controlling governmental 
- it simply obliges the state to pay compensation to an 
injured party. The argument for limited judicial review is also 
supported by a reassessment of the impact of damage awards on 
government decision-making. At one time it might have been 
possible to argue that a judicial order to pay damages would have 
a substantial impact on the allocation of financial resources by 
government among competing claims for limited funds. Whatever 
the merit of that argument in the past, the expansion of state 
revenue-raising powers and activity suggests that the risk of 
judicial control of resource allocation has been ameliorated.244 
Finally, the courts, while not the sole institution available to 
provide compensation and to ensure accountability, are indepen- 
dent, at least on a relative basis, from the state.Z45 
The conclusion which one draws from this analysis and what is 
apparent from the cases which I discuss later, is that judges will 
review alleged bureaucratic incompetence only in cases of 
and wrongfulZ4' individual bureaucratic activities 
which take place in a direct relationship with private individuals. 
The ultimate judicial concern appears to be that judicial review in 
243 P.P. Craig, "Negligence in the Exercise of a Statutory Power", 94 L.Q.R. 428 (1978), 
at p. 446. This perspective reinforces the compensatory rather than injunctive charac- 
teristic of the corrective justice model of law making. The damage award obliges the 
government to calculate the risks generated by its activity, and establish an insurance 
scheme to provide compensation to losers. 
244 See D. Engdahl, "Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs", 44 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1972), at pp. 59,60. 
245 K.C. Davis, Adminbrrative Law (1972), p. 497. 
246 A prerequisite to judicial review in all cases is the preliminary determination that the 
act of the bureaucrat was not authorized. See text, infra, at footnotes 248 to 263. 
247 Not only must the behaviour be unlawful, it must be associated with fault, either in 
terms of subjective bad faith or of negligence. See Malar v.  Bjornson, [I9781 5 W.W.R. 
429 at p. 435, 6 C.C.L.T. 142 at p. 150 (B.C.S.C.), affd 114 D.L.R. (3d) 612, 23 
B.C.L.R. 235 (C.A.); Inland Feeders Lrd. v .  Virdi (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 685, [I9821 
1 W.W.R. 551 (B.C.C.A.). The same analysis is applied in the case of statutory duties. 
See Canadian Pacific Airlines Lrd. v. The Queen (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 511 at pp. 515- 
16, [I9791 1 F.C. 39 at p. 45. 
Similarly, the courts repeatedly stress that they will not impose liability simply for 
"errors of judgment". See Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Lrd., [I9701 2 All E.R. 
294, [I9701 A.C. 1004 (H.L.). 
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the form of damage awards does not influence the institution of 
government. That is, the damage award is designed to have only a 
minimal instrumental effect on bureaucratic activity. 
It is well established that if an employee or agent of the state 
acts within his lawfully delegated area of authority, there is no 
judicial review of the activity for the purposes of establishing civil 
liability.248 At this early stage in the development of the scope of 
judicial review of administrative incompetence, the criteria which 
the judges will use to determine the lawfulness of bureaucratic 
activity have not been fully articulated, and one must keep in 
mind that the decision of unlawfulness is simply a technique 
which will permit the courts to legitimize their role as reviewers of 
executive action. Some judges have indicated that an activity or 
decision will be unlawful if the decision was so unreasonable that 
no reasonable person could hold that the statutory object would 
be furthered by the decision.249 Others suggest that a decision will 
be unlawful where no reasonable person could argue that it was 
justified by the delegating instrument;250 where the decision is so 
unreasonable that there has been no exercise of the delegated 
discretion;251 and most commonly, where there is no evidence or 
rational explanation upon which to base the discretionary 
248 See Anm v .  London Borough of Merton, [I9771 2 All E.R. 492 at pp. 501,503,505-6, 
[I9771 2 W.L.R. 1024 p. 1037 (H.L.); Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., supra, 
footnote 247 at p. 333 All E.R., p. 1068 A.C.; Hogg, supra, footnote 236 at pp. 72-7, 
81, 104; James v. Commonwealth (1939), 62 C.L.R. 339; Takaro Properties Ltd. v. 
Rowling, [I9781 2 N.Z.L.R. 314 at p. 340; K.C. Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise 
(St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1958), p. 487. 
This analysis has been adopted in Canada. See Diversified Holdings Ltd. v. The 
Queen in righr of British Columbia (1982), 133 D.L.R. (3d) 712 at pp. 720-3, 35 
B.C.L.R. 349 at pp. 358-60 (S.C.), affd 143 D.L.R. (3d) 529,41 B.C.L.R. 29 (C.A.); 
Barratt v. District of North Vancouver (1978), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 473, 6 B.C.L.R. 319 
(C.A.), affd 114 D.L.R. (3d) 577, [I9801 2 S.C.R. 418; Berryland Canning Co. Ltd. v. 
The Queen (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 568, [I9741 1 F.C. 91 (T.D.); Central Canada Potash 
Co. Lrd. v. Government of Saskatchewan (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 609 at p. 642, [I9791 1 
S.C.R. 42 at p. 90. 
249 See Home Ofjice v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., supra, footnote 247 at pp. 331-5 All E.R., 
pp. 1067-71 A.C., per Lord Diplock; Nielsen v .  Ciry of Kamloops (1981), 129 D.L.R. 
(3d)111,[1982]1 W.W.R.461(B.C.C.A.). 
so See H. W.R. Wadz, Administrative Law, 4th ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 
628; Harlow, supra, footnote 234 at p. 532. 
3 1  See cases, supra, footnote 249. 
s2 Malat v. Bjormon (1980) 114 D.L.R. (3d) 612 at p. 619, 23 B.C.L.R. 235 at p. 242 
(C.A.); Craig, supra, footnote 243 at p. 429. Thus in Nielsen v. Ciry of Kamloops, 
supra, footnote 249, Lambert J.A. held, at p. 119 D.L.R., p. 469 W.W.R., that "a 
decision not to act at all, or a failure to decide to act, cannot be supported by any 
reasonable policy choice." 
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It is not clear if there is a distinction among these tests, or if it 
matters. 
The important point is that the judges feel it necessary for good 
reason to rationalize their interference by stigmatizing the 
bureaucratic behaviour as "unlawful". This emphasizes the 
blameworthiness of the defendant's conduct and reinforces the 
corrective justice philosophy which I believe fuels judicial activity 
in this area. In addition, where the court adopts the "no rational 
justification for the exercise of discretion" criterion of unlawful- 
ness, the state as the defendant must offer, publicly, the rationale 
or  justification for its activity. While the scope of judicial review 
is perhaps limited, the state justification must be made in public, 
which encourages, or at least permits, political accountability. 
A further explanation for the judicial requirement of unlaw- 
fulness is the view that by predicating judicial review on a deter- 
mination of unlawfulness, the courts will not be risking executive 
retaliation253 against judicial interference with bureaucratic 
government. Where the court can say that a public servant has 
disregarded the limits of authority delegated to him by a superior 
decision-maker, the courts will simply reinforce the expected 
bureaucratic sanction by imposing a complementary legal 
sanction.254 The courts can thus identify their activity as an 
adjunct to the internal disciplinary action which the bureaucrat 
will face. 
The judicial requirement of unlawfulness is also explained by 
the nature of state liability under the Crown Liability Act. The 
plaintiff must, under s. 3 of the Act, point to a tort committed by 
an individual employee or  agent who will be personally liable to 
the plaintiff. The possible catastrophic impact of personal liability 
in damages (which the bureaucrat may not be able to shift to his 
employer) suggests that the court may be reluctant to impose 
personal liability for activity which an official was lawfully 
instructed to carry Further, s. 3(6) of the Act provides that 
253The courts must be aware of the power of the defendant to retaliate. See Harlow, 
supra, footnote 234 at p. 540. 
Z4 See e .g . ,  Home Ofice v .  Dorser Yacht Co. Ltd. ,  supra, footnote 247, where Lord 
Diplock made the point that the officers in control of the prisoners disregarded their 
instructions concerning the preventive means which they ought to have taken to 
prevent the escape of the prisoners. 
255 See Fox-Hitchner v .  Province of Alberta, Burr and Foster (1977). 6 A.R. 43, 3 C.P.C. 
288 (S.C.T.D.); Wade, supra, footnote 250. 
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A determination of unlawfulness is, however, not dispositive in 
establishing Crown liabiIit~.~6l Under the Crown Liability Act the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the civil servant committed a tort, 
which in most cases will involve either a decision that the 
employee acted in bad faith262 or ,  alternatively, was negligent in 
carrying out a statutory duty or  in exercising a statutory 
The issue of judicial review of bureaucratic incompetence in 
the performance of mandatory statutory duties or  in the exercise 
of statutory discretion will, it seems, be considered in the context 
of a negligence action. At one time it was thought that breach of a 
statutory duty would develop as a conceptually distinct private 
law action. Recent cases suggest however, that traditional negli- 
gence concepts will be applied both to activities rendered 
pursuant to mandatory statutory duties and to discretionary 
statutory directives. In the former case, which may arise under 
the Department of Supply and Services A ~ t , 2 6 ~  the action may be 
framed as a "breach of statutory duty",265 while in the latter case 
it will be framed in common law negligence terms.266 In both 
cases, the court must determine whether a bureaucrat (or a group 
of bureaucrats) in carrying out statutory responsibilities, owed a 
legal duty of care to the person who alleges that he was injured as 
a result of the negligent performance of those statutory responsi- 
bilities. 
The decision to impose a private legal duty on bureaucratic 
261 See Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v.  Metropolitan Corp. of Greater Winnipeg (1970), 22 
D.L.R. (3d) 470, [I9711 S.C.R. 957; Bowen v.  City of Edmonton (1977), 80 D.L.R. 
(3d) 501 at p. 514,119771 6 W.W.R. 344 at p. 360 (Alta. S.C.T.D.). 
262 See J.  McBride, "Damages as a Remedy for Unlawful Administrative Action", [I9791 
Camb. L.J. 323; B. Gould, "Damages as a Remedy in Administrative Law", 5 
N.Z.U.L.R. 105 (1972). 
263 It is not surprising that the courts demand more than simple unlawfulness before they 
will impose liability on individual civil servants. This accords with the corrective justice 
paradigm which I believe is operative in this area of law. As well, it is quite possible 
that the public law role of the judges would be limited to a substantial degree if they 
were to do  otherwise. See Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee (New 
Zealand), Damages in Administrative Law (1980), a t  pp. 34-5. 
R.S.C. 1970, c. S-18. 
265 See Hogg, supra, footnote 236 at pp. 99-104. 
266 In the case of an alleged breach of a statutory duty, the court will often ask whether the 
statute establishes a private right of action for the breach of the statutory duty. See 
Hogg, supra, footnote 236 at p. 100; de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action, 4th ed. (London, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1980), p. 530; Curler v. Wandsworth 
Stadium Ltd., [I9491 A.C. 398 (H.L.), at p. 407; Canadian Federation of Independent 
Business v.  The Queen (1974). 49 D.L.R. (3d) 718 at p. 720, [I9741 2 F.C. 443 at pp. 
449-50 (T.D.). 
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activity has been said to depend on the nature of the activity 
under review. Where the bureaucratic decision takes place within 
the operational sphere of government, the court will hold that the 
bureaucrat owes the individual a private, legal duty of care. 
Conversely, policy or planning decisions of bureaucrats are 
beyond judicial review. This categorical distinction has been 
adverted to with increasing frequency since the House of Lords' 
decision in Anns v. London Borough of Mert0n.26~ 
The categorization of governmental functions into policy and 
operational spheres, even if we could agree on the criteria to use 
in determining into which camp one should put a particular 
decision, is entirely artificial. The description of the foam 
insulation approval process which took place in the context of a 
financial incentive grant programme, which itself was an element 
in a multi-sector conservation policy, which itself was an aspect of 
a national energy programme designed to achieve energy self- 
sufficiency in Canada suggests that each bureaucratic decision is 
both an operational and a policy or planning decision. Each 
decision, in most cases, will be made in the context of imple- 
menting a superior policy decision; and will itself constitute a 
superior policy decision which will be implemented by inferior 
operational (policy) decisions. It is not that a decision has both 
operational and policy aspects, and that as the former predomi- 
nates the court is more likely to review it.268 Rather, the decision 
26' This bipartite test was first stated by the House of Lords in Anns v. London Borough of 
Merton, [I9771 2 All E.R. 492, [I9771 2 W.L.R. 1024. It has been adopted almost 
without criticism by Canadian courts. See Nielsen v. City of Kamloops (1981), 129 
D.L.R.  (3d) 111, [I9821 1 W.W.R. 461 (B.C.C.A.); Barratt v .  District of Norrh 
Vancouver (1978). 89 D.L.R. (3d) 473, 6 B.C.L.R. 319 (C.A.); Johnson v .  Adamson 
(1981), 128 D.L. R. (3d) 470 at p. 475,34 0. R. (2d) 236 at p. 241 (C. A.). 
Every case which I have been able to discover adopts this categorical framework of 
analysis. Under this analysis the issue of judicial review is absolute. Where the court 
decides that the decision is "operational", it will hold that the bureaucrat owed the 
class of persons to whom the plaintiff belongs a private legal duty of care, and will then 
go on to determine whether the activity was "negligent". Where the court decides that 
the decision was a "policy" decision, it will hold that no legal duty of care arises, and 
thus that the conduct is immune from judicial review. See M. Bridges, "Governmental 
Liability, The Tort of Negligence and the House of Lords Decision in Anns v. Merton 
London B.C.", 24 McGill L.J. 277 (1978). at p. 285; J.A. Smillie, "Negligence and 
Economic Loss", 32 U.T.L.J. 231 (1982), at p. 265. 
2-58 Cf. Anns v .  London Borough of Merton, supra, footnote 267 at p. 500, per Lord 
Wilberforce. 
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is both a planning and an operational decision, and the court must 
decide whether it will review the policy/operational decision.269 
The categorization demanded by Anns will certainly breed 
apparently inconsistent decisions, and produce simplistic defini- 
tions of policy decisions contrasted with operational decisions.270 
What we must keep in mind is that we do not have policy and 
operational decisions in government. We have decisions, some of 
which are appropriate for judicial review, and some of which are 
not. What we need are the tools to assist us in making the distinc- 
tion. For the time being we are working within a conceptual 
framework which, at the very least, should require the courts to 
formulate their reasons for deciding that a particular act is appro- 
priate for review. I have identified several interdependent 
variables which I consider to be relevant to this determination. 
No doubt there are many others. 
I have chosen to describe the first variable as "standards of 
conduct". To a very large degree, the reticence of the courts to 
review bureaucratic behaviour is due to their inability to identify 
an independent, external, pre-existing objective standard against 
which to assess the executive de~ision.~'' Where the court is able 
to identify a superior bureaucratic standard pursuant to which the 
decision under review ought to have been exercised, it is able to 
assert that the fault of the latter consists of a departure from a 
standard. The court can thus avoid evaluating "fault" in terms of 
269 What the UFFI case study demonstrates is the development of administrative policy at 
the "implementation" stage of governmental action. Superior policy instruments which 
appear to give bureaucrats unlimited discretion, are applied through the development 
of inferior policy to restrict the exercise of that discretion. See Molot, "The Self- 
Created Rule of Policy and Other Ways of Exercising Administrative Discretion", 18 
McGill L.J. 340 (1972); Robinson, "The Making of Administrative Policy: Another 
Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform", 118 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1970); K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969), at pp. 97-103; J. 
Willis, Canadian Boards at Work (Toronto, MacMillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1941), at 
p. 71; Re Becker and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1977), 15 A.L.R. 
696 at p. 701 (reference to departmental policy). 
270 See cases at footnote 267, supra. See also Toews v. MacKenzie (1980). 109 D.L.R. (3d) 
473, 119801 4 W. W. R. 108 (B.C.C. A.); Canadian Federation of Independent Business 
v. The Queen, supra, footnote 266 at p. 723 D.L.R., p. 450 F.C.; The Queen in right of 
P. E.I. v.  The Queen in right of Canada (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 465 at pp. 483-4, [I9761 
2 F.C. 712 at pp. 733-4 (T.D.), appeal dismissed, cross appeal allowed 83 D.L.R. (3d) 
492, 119781 1 F.C. 533 (C.A.); Berryland Canning Co. Ltd. v. The Queen (1974). 44 
D.L. R. (3d) 568,119741 1 F.C. 91 (T.D.); Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. The Queen 
(1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 511 at pp. 519-21, [I9791 1 F.C. 39 at pp. 50-3 (C.A.). 
Craig, supra, footnote 243 at p. 434; R. Pepper, "The Negligent Exercise of Statutory 
Power: A Comment on Kwong v. The Queen", 39 U.T.F.L.R. 77 (1981), at p. 93. 
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the abstract propriety of the conduct according to the personal 
view of the judge as to  the correctness of the decisi0n.~72 The 
existence of a standard is important for several reasons. First, it 
reduces the risk that the legitimacy of judicial discretion will be 
questioned. Second, the court need not spend inordinate 
amounts of time and resources developing the standard against 
which to assess the bureaucratic conduct. Finally, the court, 
where it applies a superior bureaucratic standard, is in fact 
reinforcing the position of the superior bureaucrat, by adding a 
legal sanction to whatever internal disciplinary measures exist. 
Thus Lord Diplock in Dorset could state that the role of 
the court was to deter the government employees from 
completely disregarding the interests of the escaped prisoners; 
and in the standard against which the inspector's conduct 
was assessed was to take reasonable care to observe that the 
government's own bylaws were observed.275 
The identification of an independent standard of conduct 
developed within the bureaucracy may be facilitated where the 
alleged negligence takes place in the context of "programmed 
decisions". This second variable acknowledges that the bureau- 
cratic process may be described as a series of discretionary 
decisions with varying degrees of uniqueness.276 As decisions 
become routine, and must be made more frequently, it is less 
likely that discretion can be exercised, and the "correctness" of a 
particular programmed decision can be evaluated through a 
comparison with other decisions of the same class. The bureau- 
crat's own decision becomes the standard.277 In the foam 
insulation case, one might examine the governmental standard- 
setting process, including evaluative techniques, variables under 
inquiry, the identity of the participants and the independence of 
the research data, which was applied in the case of the several 
272 See Harlow, supra, footnote 234 at p. 517. 
273 Home Ofice v.  Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., [I9701 2 All E.R. 294 at pp. 331-5, [I9701 A.C. 
1004 at pp. 1067-71. 
274 Supra, footnote 267 at p. 501 All E.R., p. 1035 W.L.R.,per Lord Wilberforce. 
275 Thus in the foam insulation case, the prospects of judicial review would be increased to 
the extent that one can identify superior policy decisions within the Department of 
Energy, Mines and Resources, the Department of Supply and Services, the National 
Research Council o r  the C.M.H.C. which were not observed by the bureaucracy. 
276 See K. Kernaghan, Public Administration in Canada, 3rd ed. (1977), p. 314. 
n7The courts are well aware of this "uniqueness" concept. See A.-G. Ont. v. Palmer 
(1979), 108 D.L.R. (3d) 349 at p. 351,28 O.R. (2d) 35 at p. 37 (C.A.). 
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insulation products for which standards were set. These 
programmed decisions may provide an objective basis upon 
which to determine the "reasonableness" of the state conduct in 
the particular case of establishing a foam insulation standard. 
The third variable which the courts have recognized as an 
element in the establishment of a legal duty of care is the degree 
of discretion exercised by the bureaucrat whose conduct is under 
inquiry. Even where a superior standard of conduct can be 
identified, it may be that the inferior bureaucratic conduct is 
characterized by substantial discretionary elements which point 
away from judicial review.278 While it is true that the mere 
presence of discretion will not preclude review,279 the court must 
be aware of the political risks which it runs were it to identify 
conflicting interests of the classes of persons likely to be affected 
by the decision, place a value or weight on those interests, and 
perhaps identify a general public interest in the pursuit of the 
activity in question. The court, even in this case, has standards 
which it can apply - the difficulty is that the criteria involve 
elements of social wisdom, political practicability, and economic 
expediency,280 whose application might expose the court to 
political retaliation and social criticism. As well, the self-defined 
role of the courts has been to deny the exercise of judicial 
discretion and, as the bureaucratic decision is characterized by 
increasing discretionary authority, it becomes difficult to disguise 
what the court is doing. 
The fourth variable which should be considered focuses on the 
nature of the private interest affected by the bureaucratic activity. 
It is possible that the long history of judicial review of nuisance 
cases involving interference with use of land,2g1 and a similar 
willingness to review police enforcement practices,282 reflects 
27s See Toews v. MacKenzie, supra, footnote 270. 
279 See Nielsen v .  City of Kamloops, supra, footnote 267; Johnson v .  State of California, 
447 P.2d 352 (1968). But see Craig, supra, footnote 243 at p. 444. 
=Osee Blessing v. United States, 447 F .  Supp. 1160 (1978). This factor explains the 
concern of some commentators that the "impartiality of the courts would be impaired if 
it were asked to make value judgments on matters of social and economic policy". See 
The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Working Paper and Survey: 
Review of Administrative Decisions, Part I - Appeals (1978), at para. 4.17. 
281 See e.g . ,  Managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District v .  Hill (1881), 6 App. Cas. 193 
(H.L.); Harlow, supra, footnote 234 at pp. 527-33. 
282 See Weiler, "The Control of Police Arrest Practices: Reflections of a Tort Lawyer" in 
Linden, ed.,  Studies in Canadian Tort Law (1968); Christie v. Leachinsky, [I9471 A.C. 
573 (H.L.); Koechlin v. Waugh and Hamilton (1957), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 447, [I9571 
O.W.N. 245 (C.A.); Harlow,supra, footnote 234 at pp. 527-8. 
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judicial values which demand a greater degree of bureaucratic 
circumspection where land ownership or  occupation, or 
individual freedom, are at stake. This consideration may have 
been influencing Linden J. in Johnston v. A.-G. Can. ,283 who 
refused to follow an earlier decision284 denying the existence of a 
duty of care in similar circumstances. One explanation offered by 
Linden J. was that in the former case the plaintiff suffered 
personal injuries, while in the latter the alleged loss was purely 
economic. It may be that the nature of the injuries in the foam 
insulation case, where they can be identified as the loss of the 
family home and serious risks of personal injury, will point 
towards judicial review. 
A fifth variable which may be relevant in deciding if judicial 
review ought to take place looks to the unintentional nature of the 
government activity. Where a bureaucrat makes a deliberate 
choice to injure a particular class of individuals, or to expose that 
class to the risk of injury, the question as to whether the losers 
should be compensated has not been perceived as a question for 
the judiciary. In such cases, the decision will most likely have 
been authorized, and where the injury is deliberate, the combi- 
nation of lawfulness and intentional infliction of injury suggests 
that political review will be the appropriate mechanism for 
redress. It is difficult to picture deliberate, lawful activity as 
wrongful in the context of the corrective justice model of law- 
making. As well, judicial sanctions imposed on deliberate 
governmental activity may result in retaliation, which may not 
take place where judicial review is restricted to unintentional 
conduct. It is always open to the bureaucracy to argue that it 
decided to expose a large class of homeowners to the risk of 
personal injury in order to expedite the establishment of a home 
insulation programme, and that this decision was authorized 
under the relevant statutory mandate.285 
A sixth variable involving judicial review looks to the nature of 
2 . 3  (1981), 128 D.L.R. (3d)459 at p. 468.34 O.R. (2d) 208 at pp. 215-16 (H.C.J.). 
Canadian Pacifk Airlines, Ltd. v. The Queen, supra, footnote 270 at p. 520 D.L.R., p. 
51 F.C. 
285 Where deliberate injury is unlawful, the potential for judicial review on the grounds of 
malice exists. See, supra, footnote 262. See also RoncareNi v. Duplessis (1959), 16 
D.L.R. (2d) 689, [I9591 S.C.R. 121; Gersham v. Manitoba Vegetable Producers 
Marketing Board(1976),69D.L.R. (3d) 114, [I9761 4 W.W.R. 406(Man. C.A.). 
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the government activity which is alleged to have been negligent. 
It seems that the courts will be much more willing to exercise a 
supervisory jurisdiction where the state is engaged in an activity 
which can be identified as "cornrner~ial'~ in nature, as opposed to 
activities which are characterized as " g ~ v e r n m e n t a l " . ~ ~ ~  The
distinction, which admittedly is not an easy one, is based on a 
number of factors. First, the court, in assessing a commercial 
activity carried out by government will be able to turn to the 
behaviour and practice of private enterprise as an independent, 
objective standard against which to gauge the reasonableness of 
the government b e h a v i o ~ r . ~ ~ ~  Secondly, where the state is 
engaged in commercial activities in competition with private 
enterprise, the court may be concerned that the state not be given 
competitive advantages, and thus will subject the public enter- 
prise to the same constraints as its private counterparts.288 Where, 
on the other hand, the state is engaged in providing a service 
which would not, for a variety of reasons, be produced through 
the market, the court may consider it inappropriate to impose 
market constraints. In the latter case, the traditional test of negli- 
gence which looks to the cost of injury prevention in light of the 
probability, nature and extent of the injury, gives rise to serious 
inconsistencies. The public, non-commercial enterprise does not 
necessarily operate subject to the pricing and budgetary 
constraints imposed by the costs of labour, capital and other 
inputs, and by market competition.289 Where the activity is 
commercial in nature, however, it may be subject to constraints 
analogous to those operating in private enterprises. 
%See Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v .  Winnipeg (1970), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 470, [I9711 S.C.R. 
957 (potential liability of city in negligence when exercising business powers); Virdi and 
Thompson-Nicola Regional District v .  Inland Feeders Ltd. (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 685 
at pp. 688-9, [I9821 1 W.W.R. 551 at p. 555 (B.C.C.A.). See also North and Wartime 
HousingLtd. v. Madden, [I9441 4 D.L.R. 161, [I9441 Que. K.B. 366, appeal dismissed 
[I9451 1 D.L.R. 753, [I9451 S.C.R. 169; Mersey Docks Trustees v .  Gibbs (1866), L.R. 1 
H.L. 93. 
287This is most obvious in the case of government road construction, in which the 
techniques of road construction used in private industry are familiar to the courts. See 
R. v. Core; Millette v. Kalogeropoulos (1974), 51 D.L.R. (3d) 244, [I9761 1 S.C.R. 595. 
See generally, East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v .  Kenr, [I9411 1 A.C. 74 (H.L.), 
where the defendant's behaviour is compared with that of a private building contractor. 
See also Boynton v .  The Commissioners for the Ancholme Drainage and Navigation, 
[I9211 2 K.B. 213 (C.A.). 
*8 See British Columbia Power Corp. Ltd. v. A.-G.  B.C. (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 25 at p. 
29,38 W.W.R. 657 at pp. 661-2 (B.C.C.A.). 
Z9 See British Railways Board v.  Herrington, [I9721 A.C. 877 (H.L.), at p. 899. 
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In addition, the state, where it is engaged in a commercial 
activity, may be able to pass on the costs of the negligence 
liability to the users of the government service or  This 
loss allocation mechanism may not be as easy to implement in the 
case of non-commercial, governmental activities,291 where access 
to the service cannot be controlled to the same degree. In the case 
of commercial activities the loss will be borne, to some degree, by 
the users of the service or good. The beneficiaries of the 
government programme and policy decisions will, in the 
commercial context, be compensating the losers. This transfer 
from winners to losers may take place in "governmental" activ- 
ities as well, but the redistribution is more likely to take place 
through pricing decisions in the provision of commercial services. 
In governmental activities the bureaucratic and political embar- 
rassment accompanied by public, forced compensation may point 
away from a decision to allocate the costs of regulation to the 
beneficiaries of government decisions.292 Finally, the willingness 
of the court to review commercial governmental activities may be 
justified on the basis of protecting expectations of individuals who 
may find it difficult to distinguish between private and public 
enterprises when the latter are carrying on commercial 
activities.293 
The activity of the government in the foam insulation case runs 
from the creation of an energy conservation programme, to 
standard setting of product quality, to the encouragement of 
product purchases through information dissemination. The 
standard-setting process has been classified as a policy decision in 
several American cases,294 even though political scientists might 
describe this activity as administrative rather than policy-making 
in nature.295 Cases of government information transfer to 
290This cost may in fact be spread through an insurance arrangement which, at least in the 
case of relatively small governmental units, may be available in the case of commercial 
activities. It might not be available in respect of "governmental" functions. 
291 See Hogg, supra, footnote 236 at pp. 89-90. 
292 See J .  Quinn and M. Trebilcock, Compensation, Transition Costs and Regulatory 
Change, Working Paper No. 18, Economic Council of Canada (1981), at p. 23. 
293 See Berardinelli v.  Ontario Housing Corp. (1978), 90 D.L.R. (3d) 481 at p. 495, [I9791 
1 S.C.R. 275 at p. 283. 
294 See Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, 610 F.2d 558 (1979). Cf. Grifin v.  United 
States, 500 F.2d 1059 (1974). This governmental immunity has not been the case in all 
jurisdictions. See J.G. Fleming, "Drug Injury Compensation Plans", 30 Am. J .  of 
Comp. L. 297 (1982), at p. 318. 
295 See Public Government for Private People, The Report of the Commission of Freedom 
of Information and Individual Privacy, Vol. 2 (1980), at pp. 192-4. 
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encourage or facilitate private transactions have, however, been 
the subject of judicial review on several occasions.296 The explan- 
ation for the willingness of the court to review the government's 
role as an information broker is that to require the government to 
disseminate accurate information is a relatively non-intrusive 
judicial role. In many cases the transaction costs of the inform- 
ation transfer will be relatively insignificant, especially where, as 
in the foam insulation case, the state has decided to establish an 
information transfer system in the pursuit of its policy objectives. 
As well, the courts are quite familiar with the regulation of 
information transfer in the private sector. Thus, while the 
provision of information by the state in the case of insulation may 
not have been a "pure" commercial activity, the nature of the 
enterprise was such that the courts may be able to invoke private 
standards which they can apply to the governmental behaviour. 
A court may, however, hesitate to impose liability on the state 
where the issue is not the duty to transfer information which the 
state possesses, but to investigate certain matters and acquire 
information which must then be transferred. In the latter case, 
the costs of information acquisition may suggest to the court that 
a private duty of care should not be established.297 The issue is a 
relative one, and in two recent cases the Federal Court has 
suggested that the information-gathering activities of Treasury 
Board officials298 and officials of the Food and Drug 
D i r e ~ t o r a t e ~ ~ ~  will be subject to judicial review.300 
296 See Hendricks v.  The Queen (1970), 9 D.L. R. (3d) 454 at p. 465, [I9701 S.C. R. 237 at 
pp. 250-1. See also cases, infra, at footnote 308. 
297 The cases support this analysis. Judges are averse to the imposition of legal duties to 
investigate, or to disclose information which the employee of the state "ought to have 
known". See Toews v. MacKenzie (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 473 at p. 480, [I9801 4 
W.W.R..108 at p. 115 (B.C.C.A.); Barratt v .  District of North Vancouver (1980), 114 
D.L.R. (3d) 577 at p. 584, [I9801 2 S.C.R. 418 at pp. 427-8; affg 89 D.L.R. (3d) 473 at 
pp. 484-5, 6 B.C.L.R. 319 at pp. 332-3 (C.A.); Grand Restaurants of Canada Ltd. v .  
City of Toronto (1981), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 349 at pp. 361-2, 32 O.R. (2d) 757 at p. 770 
(decision to inspect building is discretionary and not subject to review, while decision 
not to disclose results of inspection had it been made, will give rise to liability); 
Windsor Building Supplies Ltd. v. Art Harrison Ltd., Yanke & Son Builders Ltd., 
Third Parties (1980), 14 C.C.L.T. 129 at p. 160 (B.C.S.C.) (investigation of possible 
bylaw violations outside scope of judicial review). 
298 See Wilfred Nadeau Inc. v. The Queen in right of Canada, [I9771 1 F.C. 541 (T.D.), 
affd [I9801 1 F.C. 808 (C.A.). 
2% Berryland Canning Co. Ltd. v.  The Queen (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 568 at p. 583,119741 
1 F.C. 91 at pp. 107-8 (T.D.). The Alberta Court of Appeal, however, has suggested 
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A seventh variable which may influence a decision to impose 
civil liability on the state relates to the status or  identity of the 
government actor.301 At the ultimate level of governmental 
decision-making, the court will be asked to  assess the negligence 
of legislative acts - a responsibility which they deny 
absolutely.302 In most cases, however, the determination of 
bureaucratic status will require an assessment of the bureaucratic 
infra-structure in which the decision was made, in an effort to 
determine the responsibility and authority of this bureaucrat and 
his relationship with other political actors. The requirement that 
the court investigate the actual bureaucratic decision-making 
process and the actual nature and extent of scrutiny of the 
decision by specific bureaucratic and political actors303 is 
important for a number of reasons. As the behaviour of more 
senior bureaucrats is scrutinized, it becomes increasingly likely 
that similar bureaucratic activity is not subject to judicial review. See Kwong v .  The 
Queen in right ofAlberta (1978), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 214 at p. 231, [I9791 2 W.W.R. 1 at p. 
19 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.), affd 105 D.L.R. (3d) 576n, [I9791 2 S.C.R. 1010n. In that 
case, a decision of Gas Protection Branch officials not to  warn the public of risks posed 
by converted gas furnaces was held to be a policy decision. The Court of Appeal 
appeared to direct its attention to an alleged duty of care owed by the bureaucrats to  
the public, consisting of an obligation to advise the provincial Cabinet to enact 
regulations. (See L.W. Klar, "Developments in Tort Law: The 1979-80 Term", 2 
S.Ct.L.Rev. 325 (1981), at p. 363.) The decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed in 
a manner which suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada was analyzing the duty 
issue on the same lines. 
3w One should keep in mind in evaluating the likelihood of judicial review in the foam 
insulation case that the civil liability of product endorsers is a relatively novel devel- 
opment in products liability litigation. See Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher 
Corp.,  269 F. Supp. 109 (1967); Hanberry v .  Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680 
(1969); C.F. Pechlin, "Liability of Certifiers of Products for Personal Injuries to the 
User or Consumer", 56 Cor. L. Rev. 501 (1970); Note, "Tort Liability of Independent 
Testing Agencies", 22 Rut. L. Rev. 299 (1968). 
301 See P.S. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law, 3rd ed. (London, Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1980), pp. 61-3; Bridges, supra, footnote 267 at p. 281; Canadian Pacific 
Airlines Ltd. v .  The Queen (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 511 at p. 521, [I9791 1 F.C. 39 at p. 
53 (C.A.); Dalehite v .  United States, 346 U.S.  515 (1953); Hendry v .  United States, 418 
F.2d 774 (1969); D. Schwartz and S.B. Jacoby, Litigation with the Federal Government 
(1970), p. 204. 
302 See Kwong v .  The Queen in right o f  Alberta, supra, footnote 299 at pp. 221-3 D.L.R., 
pp. 7-9 W.W. R.; Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v .  Metropolitan Corp. of Greater Winnipeg 
(1970), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 470, 119721 3 W.W.R. 433 (S.C.C.); J.R.S. Holdings Ltd. v. 
District of Maple Ridge (1981), 122 D.L.R. (3d) 398 at p. 408, [I9811 4 W.W.R. 632 at 
p. 644 (B.C.S.C.) (no duty of care owed in the passage of legislation). 
303 See Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No. 2) 2 A.L.D. 634 
(1979), at pp. 644-5; see M.D. Kirby, "Administrative Review Beyond the Frontier 
Marked 'Policy-Lawyers Keep Out' ", 12 Fed. L. Rev. 121 (1981), at 132-3. 
Heinonline - -  8  Can. Bus. L.J. 428  1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4  
1983-841 Legal Dimensions of the UFFI Problem 429 
that political and broad discretionary decision-making will be 
involved. Further, where the court attempts to review the activ- 
ities of more senior bureaucrats it may risk political retaliation, 
and thus it is not at all surprising to discover that the majority of 
cases involving judicial review of governmental activity have 
involved municipal governments - the one tier of government 
which cannot retaliate directly by withdrawing its operations from 
judicial review. Finally, by demanding that the government 
identify the bureaucrat or group of bureaucrats who participated 
in the decision under review, the court will encourage political 
accountability where appropriate. The government can identify a 
lower level bureaucrat where it wants to minimize direct political 
responsibility, but when it does so, it risks legal liability. At the 
same time, where the state points to bureaucratic seniority to 
avoid legal responsibility, it increases the likelihood of political 
responsibility. 
The question as to the status and identity of the bureaucrat who 
made the decision under review is complemented by judicial 
concern that courts not interfere officiously in broadly based 
social disputes which may be resolved through non-legal 
processes. The availability of limited judicial resources is only 
one aspect of this attitude. The courts are also aware of the risk of 
conflicting judiciaVpolitica1 solutions to the dispute. The availa- 
bility of alternative sources of accountability - whether through 
political action304 or  through the doctrines of ministerial305 and 
bureaucratic306 responsibility - has been noted by the courts as a 
relevant factor in deciding whether to create a private right of 
action. 
Possibly the most significant factor which the courts recognize 
The Queen in right of Canada v .  The Queen in right of Prince Edward Island (1977), 83 
D.L.R. (3d) 492 at p. 520, 119781 1 F.C. 533 at p. 567 (C.A.), Appendix A (the 
question is whether political action is the sole sanction for a failure to provide adequate 
service to the public); Barratt v. Districr of North Vancouver (1978), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 
473,6B.C.L.R.319(C.A.) 
305 Canadian Federation of Independent Business v.  The Queen (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 718 
at p. 721, [1974]2F.C. 443at p. 450(T.D.). 
xxi See Stopforth v. Coyer (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 373,4 C.C.L.T. 265 (Ont. H.C.J.), revd 
97 D.L.R. (3d) 369, 8 C.C.L.T. 172 (Ont. C.A.). As Kernaghan points out, the view 
that bureaucrats are not subject to parliamentary review is being transformed as the 
policy and political decision-making roles of senior bureaucrats become impossible to 
ignore: see K. Kernaghan, Freedom of Information and Ministerial Responsibility, 
Research Publication 2, Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual 
Privacy (1978), at pp. 17-29. 
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in determining whether a private legal duty of care should be 
imposed on  the bureaucracy is the requirement of an individ- 
ualized wrong. The nature of corrective justice is that it is 
designed to  redress a perceived wrong which one party has 
committed against another. This suggests that the alleged wrong 
must be individualized in nature -there must be an "individuali- 
zation of responsibility" for the alleged negligence founded on a 
direct relation between the state employee and an individual 
member of the In fact, in almost all cases in which the 
state has been found liable for the acts of its employees the 
alleged negligent behaviour occurred in this "one-on-one" 
bilateral relationship.308 
This requirement of individualization of harm can be justified 
on a number of grounds. First, the courts ameliorate the interju- 
risdictional tension between the judiciary and executive when 
they restrict themselves to compensating individual wrongs. 
Second, the requirement of an individual nexus reduces the 
potential impact of the decision on the exercise of broadly 
described bureaucratic discretion. Third, by requiring an  indivi- 
dualistic aspect, the courts avoid the substantial administrative 
costs of determining the identity of numerous claimants, and the 
nature and extent of their alleged losses.309 As well, the existing 
procedural rules and administrative structure of the court system 
are singularly ill-suited to the resolution of group 
307 See Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Metropolitan Corp. of Greater Winnipeg, supra, 
footnote 302 at pp. 477-8 D.L.R., p. 441 W.W.R.; Kwong v.  The Queen in right of 
Alberta, supra, footnote 299 at p. 229 D.L.R., p. 16 W.W.R.; Cleveland-Cliffs Steam- 
ships Co. and Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v.  The Queen (1957), 10 D.L.R. (2d) 673 at pp. 
679-80, [I9571 S.C.R. 810 at p. 814. 
308See Grossman v. The King, [I9521 2 D.L.R. 241, [I9521 1 S.C.R. 571; O'Rourke v.  
Schacht (1974), 55 D.L. R. (3d) 96, [I9761 1 S.C. R. 53; Ostash v.  Sonnenberg (l968), 67 
D.L.R. (2d) 311, 63 W.W.R. 257; Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban District Council, 
[I9721 1 Q.B. 373 (C.A.); Ordog v.  District of Mission (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 718,31 
B.C.L.R. 371 (S.C.); Grand Restaurants of Canada Ltd. v. City of Toronto, supra, 
footnote 297; Danard v. The Queen, [I9711 F.C. 417 (T.D.); Sociedad Transoceanica 
Canopus S.A.  v. National Harbours Board, [I9681 2 Ex. C.R. 330; Lyon v.  Village of 
Shelburne; Triton Engineering Services Ltd., Third Parries (1982), 130 D.L.R. (3d) 307 
(Ont. Co. Ct.); Nielsen v. City of Kamloops (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 111 at p. 118, 
[I9821 1 W.W .R. 461 at pp. 468-9 (B.C.C.A.). 
309 See Quinn and Trebilcock, supra, footnote 292 at pp. 32-7. 
3lOThis argument works both ways. If the claim against the government should be 
permitted, the establishment of government liability will avoid the enormous litigation 
costs inherent in the alternative private, fault-based product liability cases. The admin- 
istrative costs posed by a governmental liability suit must be compared to the adminis- 
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Fourth, the courts recognize the potential instrumental effect of 
damage awards which, where they involve increasing numbers of 
plaintiffs, may have a significant prospective, instrumental 
influence on bureaucratic behavio~r .~lI  In addition, the courts are 
aware that as the number of losers increases, the prospect of 
political or parliamentary accountability increases. Finally, where 
a large number of potential losers exists, the ability of the court to 
entertain a range of interests in its decision-making process may 
be limited. The "losers" are not a homogeneous and the 
technical and quite artificial rules of evidence and procedure may 
distort the adequate representation of these disparate interests.313 
The tenth variable is probably the judicial favourite. The 
decision of the state to engage in certain activities will often 
involve an allocation of public resources, and the decision will be 
made in the context of competing claims for government largesse 
and programmes, both from within and from without the 
bureaucracy. If the alleged negligent decision involved the 
allocation of resources among competing claims for social 
resources,314 or if the impact of the decision will influence future 
resource allocation decisions,315 the decision is less likely to be 
trative costs incurred in the alternative. 1 would suspect that the former are far greater 
in magnitude. See G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970), pp. 28, 250-9; T. Ison, 
Accident Compensation (1980), p. 122; U.S. Department of Commerce, Inter-Agency 
Task Force on Products Liability, Final Report, Vol. 5 (1976); Fleming, supra, 
footnote 294 at p. 316. 
311 See text, supra, at footnote 237. 
312 The potential losers include: homeowner-purchasers of urea formaldehyde insulation; 
sub-buyers of homes; persons who relied upon information provided by government 
(and those who did not); purchasers who purchased insulation prior to C.M.H.C. 
acceptance; and those who bought after August 1977; insulation installation companies 
and their shareholders and employees; insulation component manufacturing 
companies and their shareholders and employees; a variety of insurance companies; 
and members of the public who directly or indirectly will be asked to bear the financial 
responsibility of a government liability suit. It is obvious that the interests of these 
groups may not be co-extensive. 
313 See Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., [I9701 2 All E.R. 294 at pp. 331-2, [I9701 
A.C. 1004 at p. 1067. 
314 See Cleveland-Cliffs Steamships Co. and Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v .  The Queen, 
supra, footnote 307 at pp. 679-80 D.L.R., p. 814 S.C.R. (authority involves the action 
of Parliament in voting money); Barratt v. District of North Vancouver, supra, footnote 
297; Hugh v .  Vancouver (1981), 126 D.L.R. (3d) 527 at p. 538, [I9811 5 W.W.R. 250at 
p. 264 (B.C.S.C.). 
315 Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. v. The Queen, supra, footnote 301 at p. 520 D.L.R., p. 
51 F.C. This attitude is also reflected in suggestions that the state should be liable only 
for "additional damage" caused by its negligent acts. See East Suffolk Rivers 
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reviewed.316 Once the resource allocation decision has taken 
place, then the inferior decision as to how the activity should be 
carried out may be reviewed.317 
I have no difficulty accepting the general proposition that 
resource allocation is a function which almost by definition will 
require that particular interests be sacrificed. It is also difficult to 
see how the reasonableness of a particular resource allocation 
decision could be objectively assessed by a court.318 At the same 
time, the court should appreciate that resource allocation is a 
question of degree; and that the state can obtain insurance to 
spread the costs of its activities.319 
The courts have also turned to the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction as a relevant variable in determining whether to 
impose a private duty of care on bureaucratic actors,320 although 
it is unclear whether the distinction is still doctrinally correct after 
the decision of the House of Lords in Anns v. Merton London 
Borough Council.321 At best it may have been a categorical 
relative of the policy/operational distinction.322 The distinction 
between nonfeasance and misfeasance is a difficult one to draw at 
best, and adds little to the analysis of the propriety of judicial 
review of state b e h a ~ i o u r . ~ ~ ~  None the less, judicial deference to 
Catchment Board v. Kent, [I9411 1 A.C. 74 (H.L.), at p. 83; Hogg, supra, footnote 236 
at pp. 85-91; Seguin v. Town of Hawkesbury, [I9551 5 D.L.R. 809, [I9551 O.R. 956 
(C.A.). 
S16The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Malat v. Bjornson, [I9781 5 
W.W.R. 429 at p. 437,6 C.C.L.T. 142 at p. 152, in which a decision not to implement 
an earlier decision to raise a highway barrier to 30 inches was reviewed, can be 
explained on the basis that, as the trial judge found, the implementation decision could 
have taken place "with no great expense or inconvenience". 
317 Sheppard v. Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of the Borough of Glossop, [I9211 3 K.B. 
132 (C.A.); Anns v. London Borough of Merton, [I9771 2 All E.R. 492 at p. 502, 
[I9771 2 W.L.R. 1024 at p. 1036 (H.L.); Bridges, supra, footnote 267 at p. 288; Craig, 
supra, footnote 243 at pp. 432-3. 
See text, supra, at footnotes 271-7. 
319 G.F. Kugler, Report of the Attorney-General's Task Force on Sovereign Immunity 
(1972), at pp. 118-32, 147-8; Ministry of Housing and Local Government v. Sharp, 
[I9701 2 Q.B. 223 (C.A.),at p. 269. 
320 See McCrea v. City of White Rock (1974), 56 D.L.R. (3d) 525, [I9751 2 W.W. R. 593 
(B.C.C.A.). 
321 Supra, footnote 317. See Nielsen v. Ciry of Kamloops, supra, footnote 308. But see 
Windsor Building Supplies Ltd. v. Art Harrison Ltd., Yanke & Son Builders Ltd., 
Third Parties (1980), 14 C.C.L.T. 129 (B.C.S.C.), at pp. 160-4; Kwong v.  The Queen in 
righrofAlberta (1978), 96D.L.R. (3d) 214, [I9791 2 W.W.R. 1 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.), 
affd 105 D.L.R. (3d) 576n, [I9791 6 W. W.R. 573n (S.C.C.). 
322 See Bridges, supra, footnote 267 at pp. 299-300; Neabel v. Town of Ingersoll(1967), 63 
D.L.R. (2d)484, f196712O.R. 343 (H.C.J.). 
323 In some cases the policy/operational and nonfeasance/misfeasance concepts are used as 
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bureaucratic "nonfeasance" may be understood as a reflection of 
several concerns. First, where a bureaucrat has acted, it may be 
possible to use his own intended behaviour as an objective 
standard against which to assess the reasonableness of his actual 
behaviour. Second, where an alleged loss is incurred as a result of 
governmental inactivity, the injury may be a foregone oppor- 
tunity which may be viewed as a less substantial injury than an 
actual incurred loss.324 Finally, a concern with "pure" inaction 
will often result in an inquiry as to whether the defendant's 
conduct created or increased the risk of This risk 
creation concept brings us to the final variable which I have 
identified in the judicial decision to impose a legal duty of care on 
a state employee -the concept of reliance. 
The courts appear to react to two categories of reliance. The 
first is direct reliance, common in the "individualized wrong" 
discussed earlier,326 where a member of the public relies upon acts 
or representations of a particular bureaucrat.327 The second is 
what may be called institutional reliance - the creation of an 
environment by the state in which members of the public assume 
that the state will be taking adequate precautions to ensure that 
their interests will be safeguarded. Thus in cases of pure omission 
the court may be willing to impose liability where the state has 
established an institutional framework upon which the public 
relies and where an individual refrains from adopting alternate 
measures to reduce the risk of injury, or from insu;ingagainst the 
r i ~ k . 3 ~ ~  
interchangeable concepts. See Kwong v.  The Queen in right of Alberta, supra, footnote 
321; J .  Irvine, annotation entitled "Toews v. MacKenzie", 12 C.C.L.T. 263 (1980), at 
p. 267. 
324 See E. Weinrib, "The Case for a Duty to Rescue", 90 Yale L.J. 247 (1980), at pp. 249, 
251. 
325 Weinrib, ibid., at pp. 254-7. See Grossman v. The King, supra, footnote 308; O'Rourke 
v. Schacht, supra, footnote 308; Hendricks v. The Queen (1970), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 454, 
[I9701 S.C.R. 237. 
326 See text, supra, at footnote 307. 
327 See cases at footnote 308; Town of the Pas v. Porky Packers Ltd. (1976), 65 D.L.R. 
(3d) 1, [I9771 1 S.C.R. 51; Windsor Motors Ltd. v.  District of Powell River (1969). 4 
D.L.R. (3d) 155,68 W.W.R. 173 (B.C.C.A.). The same factor has been recognized in 
the United States. See Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140 (1977), at p. 1148, cert. 
denied 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). 
328See Anns v. London Borough of Merton, supra, footnote 317 at p. 500 All E.R., p. 
1034 W.L.R.; Craig, supra, footnote 243 at p. 451; Dutton v.  Bognor Regis Urban 
District Council, [I9721 2 W.L.R. 299 at p. 308, (19721 1 Q.B. 373 at p. 392 (C.A.); 
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The reliance issue is, I think, a central concept in the decision 
to impose a legal duty on the bureaucrat. It reflects the overriding 
corrective justice philosophy which operates in this area, in that it 
demands a bilateral relationship. The bureaucrat or  bureaucracy 
assumes responsibility for a certain activity which creates a recip- 
rocal sense of trust and dependence.329 More generally, we may 
be able to see a more general interest in compensating disap- 
pointed individuals whose expectations were created by a govern- 
mental, institutional arrangement, and who relied on that 
arrangement to protect their interests.330 
4. Conclusion 
So far there is no solution to the urea formaldehyde problem. 
The nature of the urea formaldehyde foam insulation production 
process points to obvious gaps in existing product liability legisla- 
tion, and reveals the as yet rudimentary conceptual framework 
which the common law has developed to deal with complex 
products liability claims. As well, the foam insulation problem is 
not simply a legal phenomenon. 
So far the efforts of public-interest lawyers have been primarily 
directed to the design of a federal compensation programme. The 
legislation establishing the programme, the Urea Formaldehyde 
Insulation provides for an initial funding of the 
programme at $55,000,000.332 In addition, the federal 
government has established a National Advisory Council on 
UFFI, consisting of representatives of homeowners' associations 
as well as individual homeowners, whose apparent function is to 
represent the interest of unorganized homeowners in negotiations 
Bridges, supra, footnote 267 at p. 282; Weinrib, supra, footnote 324 at pp. 254-7; J.A. 
Smillie, "Negligence and Economic Loss", 32 U.T.L.J. 231 (1982), at p. 268; A. 
Linden, Canadian Negligence Law (Toronto, Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd., 
1972), at p. 82. 
However, the point has been implicitly rejected by Le Dain J. in Canadian Pacific 
Airlines Ltd. v .  The Queen (1978), 87 D.L.R.  (3d) 51 1, [I9791 1 F.C. 39 (C. A.), where 
he suggested that general reliance on a government-controlled public service or facility, 
even if it is a monopoly service, is not in and of itself sufficient to establish a legal duty 
to the public to provide it. 
329 Smillie, supra, footnote 328 at p. 268. 
330 Quinn and Trebilcock, supra, footnote 292 at p. 61. 
331 Bill C-lOg, 1st Sess., 32nd Legisl., 29-30-31 Eliz. 11, 1980-81-82. The Bill received 
Royal Assent on August 4,1982, was proclaimed in force October 25, 1982, and is nqw 
S.C. 1980-81-82, C. 119. 
332 Ibid., s .  8(1). 
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concerning the substance of the compensation programme. Legal 
representation has been retained to assist the Council. The 
Standing Committee on Health, Welfare and Social Affairs 
conducted an inquiry into urea formaldehyde foam insulation, 
and tabled its Report to Parliament in December, 1982.333 Thus 
the resolution of the compensatory objectives of the potential 
losers in the energy conservation programme is being worked out 
in the political arena. 
It is too early to predict the outcome of the political negotia- 
tions. The discussions involve a number of issues including the 
aggregate amount of compensation to be paid, the identification 
of the classes of persons eligible to receive compensation, 
controls on consumer and industry abuse of the compensation 
programme, and in particular whether the compensation 
payments should be mandatory or discretionary. Negotiations in 
the political arena are, however, distorted by the apparent 
absence of leverage available to the homeowners' associations. 
The benefits which the associations can offer to the state in return 
for increased government largesse or for concessions relating to 
the second order decision as to who should receive compensation 
are limited. They are limited, first, to political support of the 
programme, and second, to the homeowners' associations' assur- 
ances that the federal government's home insulation programme 
- the cornerstone of Canada's conservation policy - will not be 
jeopardized by public disclosure of the uninsured and unknown 
potential risks associated with insulation materials and proce- 
dures currently in use in the residential sector. 
These tentative advances in the political sector have not, 
however, been complemented by legal victories. The difficulties 
confronting individuals contemplating legal action include 
substantial organizational costs, both in terms of financial 
resources and time, and the existing legal, technical and scientific 
uncertainties regarding the outcome of possible litigation against 
the federal government, Crown corporations and commercial 
enterprises. These logistical difficulties and the unavailability, in 
333 See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Health, 
Welfare and Social Affairs, Respecting Inquiry into Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insula- 
tion, Issue No. 39, 3-8-82, at 39-3. The mandate of the Committee includes consider- 
ation of the process used to approve the material for use in Canadian homes. Ibid. See 
Report on Urea Formaldehyde Foam Insulation, Standing Committee on Health, 
Welfare and Social Affairs (December, 1982). 
Heinonline - -  8  Can. Bus. L.J. 435  1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 4  
436 Canadian Business Law Journal pol. 8 
most jurisdictions, of an effective class action procedure, have 
combined to restrict legal action to those jurisdictions in which 
the state has seen fit to subsidize the lawsuit.334 
The class action is a mechanism which would permit collective 
legal action to be organized without the direct infusion of public 
resources. It is my impression, however, that most lawyers 
involved either directly or  indirectly in the UFFI case, have 
avoided existing rudimentary class action mechanisms for a 
number of very good reasons. First, recent experience with class 
actions suggests that the defendants will almost certainly counter 
with a barrage of pre-trial motions in an attempt to have the 
proceedings dismissed for procedural irregularities.335 In light of 
the existing uncertainty as to the appropriate conceptual basis for 
class actions, that potential response cannot be disregarded. 
Further, the current procedural rules do not permit a preliminary 
application to be brought to "certify" the proceeding as appro- 
priate for a class action, nor do the current rules contemplate 
review of counsel adequacy. The prospects of a class action are 
further reduced by the enormous financial risks which lawyers or 
their clients must face if either were to finance ultimately unsuc- 
cessful legal battles on preliminary procedural grounds.336 The 
viability of a class action of national scope or perhaps of inter- 
provincial co-operation has also been adversely affected by the 
enactment of products liability legislation in Quebec, New 
Brunswick and Saskatchewan which depart to a substantial 
degree from the common law, and which differ in very significant 
respects from one another as well. There is thus a limited 
community of interest among consumers from various provinces. 
Moreover, the current representative action, even if it were 
allowed to operate in the most enlightened fashion possible, does 
not contemplate individual recovery of idiosyncratic damage 
claims subsequent to an initial determination of liability. 
334 Discussions with members of the Advisory Council indicate that the provinces of 
Quebec and New Brunswick are assisting homeowner associations in this manner. 
335 Naken v .  General Motors of Canada Ltd. (1979). 92 D.L.R. (3d) 100,21 0 . R .  (2d) 780 
(C.A.),  revd 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385,32 C.P.C. 138 (S.C.C.), is now infamous. See also, 
Cobbold v. Time Canada Ltd. (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 611,28 O.R. (2d) 326 (H.C.J.); 
York Condominium Corp. No. 148 v. Singular Investments Ltd. (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 
61, 16 O.R. (2d) 31 (H.C.J.); Seafarers International Union of Canada v.  Lawrence 
(1979). 97 D.L.R. (3d) 324, 24 O.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.); Stephemon v .  Air Canada 
(1979), 103 D.L.R. (3d) 148,26 O.R. (2d) 369 (H.C.J.). All of these cases gave riseto 
pre-trial applications to dismiss the action on procedural grounds. 
3% See Cobbold v. Time Canada Ltd., supra, footnote 335. 
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Even if recovery on this basis were possible the utility of the 
class action is open to question where, as in the UFFI case, the 
class of potential beneficiaries may consist of conflicting interest 
groups. The current rules do not contemplate either notice or 
opting-out mechanisms, nor are there methods in place to resolve 
intra-class conflict. Finally, the class action in Federal Court is 
subject to substantial free-rider problems where the potential 
class members are able to predict that the defendant may, as a 
matter of political necessity, compensate all homeowners if one 
suit is successful. 
The result of the archaic class action procedures has been the 
creation of a corporate class action vehicle in Ontario.337 This 
arrangement contemplates the incorporation of a non-profit 
corporation authorized, by each member, to retain a lawyer on 
behalf of that member. The member also delegates to the board 
of directors authority to make all litigation decisions on his 
behalf, except for an agreement to settle the action. The lawyer, 
acting for each member, will then commence legal proceedings 
against the identical defendant(s) in each case, alleging the 
identical wrong, and claiming liquidated damages on behalf of 
each client. A major risk in this action, as in the class action, is 
the degree of centralization of decision-making. The existing 
corporate structure contemplates a four-man board of directors, 
with the president having the deciding vote. The retainer 
provides that the lawyer will be instructed by one individual 
appointed by the board. The risks of intra-class conflicts of 
interest arise in this case to the same extent as they arise 'in the 
current, unsophisticated class action procedure, and again no 
effective mechanism for resolving the conflicts appears to exist. 
The political, legal, and social implications of the urea formal- 
dehyde foam insulation problem have created a product liability 
phenomenon which transcends the boundaries of a single societal 
institution. A satisfactory resolution of the problem, if there is 
one, may be possible only through the creation of a decision- 
making body, with authority to award compensation, which 
avoids the institutional limitations inherent in the current judicial 
system and can perhaps also overcome the inadequacies of the 
existing procedural and substantive legal rules. 
337 See, infra, this issue, Comment by Andrew Roman. 
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Comment on David Cohen's Paper: The Public and 
Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem 
Michael J. Trebilcock* 
Liability for Economic Loss 
The urea formaldehyde disaster raises a number of important 
and intricate issues of public policy. These relate to the civil 
liability of private suppliers of defective consumer products, the 
compensatory obligations of government towards losers from its 
policy-making and regulatory activities, and issues of the appro- 
priate structure and processes of regulatory agencies charged with 
public standard setting for products that may present health 
hazards but where considerable technical or scientific uncertainty 
initially surrounds the existence and extent of the hazards. 
Professor Cohen's paper very ably and comprehensively 
canvasses many of these issues. 
1 wish to comment on those aspects of Professor Cohen's paper 
that focus on the civil liability of direct and indirect suppliers of a 
defective product for what he calls abstract economic loss - 
essentially the substantial decline in market value of the homes of 
purchasers of UFFI as a result of now generalized perceptions of 
the risks entailed in living in such homes. The prevailing doctrinal 
impediments to recovery especially against indirect suppliers 
(manufacturers) are not to be gainsaid. The question I would like 
to address briefly is, what would an optimal liability regime look 
like? In examining this question, I will focus primarily on the 
consumer-manufacturer relationship. Installers seem to be too 
insubstantial a target to warrant practical consideration and, in 
any event, seem to have controlled few of the key product safety 
inputs. Removal costs facing the 80,000-odd homeowners who 
purchased UFFI may run anywhere between 1 billion and 1.5 
billion dollars (which may, of course, in many cases, render even 
manufacturer liability moot). 
This problem aside, economic analysis would tend to evaluate 
product liability regimes against two distinct objectives - a 
deterrent objective and an insurance (compensation) objective - 
not clearly enough identified and differentiated in Cohen's paper. 
With respect to deterrence, there is now wide consensus in the 
' Director, Law and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. 
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law and economics literature that where significant consumer 
misperception (underestimation) of risk is present, the first best 
liability regime is strict liability, with a contributory negligence 
defence if cost-justified consumer avoidance precautions are 
possible (not, it seems, the case in the UFFI case).' What strict 
liability achieves from a deterrence perspective is two things. 
First, at least in theory, it forces manufacturers to adopt an 
efficient level of care by balancing product defect costs to the 
consumer against the costs of possible avoidance precautions to 
the manufacturer and minimizing the sum of these two sets of 
costs. Each manufacturer must make his own calculus, unlike a 
negligence regime where courts must undertake the balancing 
exercise, often in the face of complex and perhaps biased inform- 
ation about a manufacturer's avoidance possibilities (e.g., 
product modification) and associated costs. Second, strict 
liability, by forcing adjustments in product prices to reflect 
expected accident costs, even where these costs are unavoidable, 
leads to an efficient level of output in the industry by causing 
consumers to act, in response to relative prices, as if they were 
fully informed. A negligence regime, on the other hand, given 
consumer underestimation of residual risks, will lead to too high a 
level of output being demanded in the industry in question, even 
if the appropriate standard of care is correctly determined in 
individual cases. 
From an insurance perspective, if one assumes that most 
consumers are risk averse, especially with respect to significant 
risks to health or significant risks of substantial economic losses, 
then the issue becomes whether manufacturers are the least-cost 
providers of insurance (through a strict liability regime). In the 
UFFI case, certainly as between manufacturer and consumer, it 
seems highly likely that manufacturers were better placed than 
consumers to appraise the risks, i .e . ,  the probabilities of product 
breakdown and consequences associated therewith and were 
better placed than consumers to pool the risks either by taking 
1 See e.g., A.  Michael Spence, "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer 
Liability", 44 Rev. Econ. Stud. 561 (1977); Steven Shavell, "Strict Liability Versus 
Negligence", 9 J .  Legal Studies 1 (1980); Dennis Epple and Arthur Raviv, "Product 
Safety: Liability Rules, Market Structure and Imperfect Information", 68 Am. Ewn. 
Rev. 80 (1978); A.  Mitchell Polinsky, "Strict Liability Versus Negligence in a Market 
Setting", 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 367 (1980); Richard Crasswell, "Products Liability and The 
Duty to Disclose", J. Legal Studies (forthcoming). 
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out product liability insurance or diversifying the risks across 
various chemical or other product lines. 
I conclude that an optimal liability regime for manufacturers in 
the UFFI situation is strict liability. However, this conclusion 
does not resolve the question of what costs strict liability should 
confront manufacturers with. 
Cohen is concerned that to allow all homeowners who had 
UFFI installed to recover the depreciation they have suffered in 
the value of their houses (assuming enforced disclosure of the 
presence of UFFI) ignores the fact that the product is not 
defective (a health hazard) in all cases and that not all consumers 
may react adversely to it, even when it is ( i .e . ,  reactions may be 
allergic in nature). I am not convinced by his concerns. 
From a deterrent perspective, the objective of the choice of 
liability regimes is to ensure that all suppliers (and indirectly all 
consumers) are confronted with the full social costs associated 
with use of a product. This promotes efficient resource allocation. 
In the light of this objective, the analysis might usefully proceed 
in two stages. First, contemplate a scenario where all units of the 
product are defective and where all homeowners react or  will, 
over time, react adversely to it. Consider also that efficiency 
considerations require that there should be a duty on 
homeowners to mitigate the anticipated adverse health hazards 
by taking appropriate avoidance precautions where the former 
are more costly than the latter. These precautions presumably 
involve removing the UFFI, installing new insulation, and 
suffering disruption costs in the process. In this case, I would 
assume that the market depreciation in the value of homes that 
have not been repaired will roughly approximate these costs. 
Thus either the repair costs (fully calculated) or  the depreciation 
costs should be reasonable measures of damage and properly 
reflect the additional social costs (the real resource costs) 
associated with the purchase of the defective product. 
Consider next the scenario in the UFFI case posited by Cohen 
where the market writes down all houses containing UFFI 
without discriminating between defective and non-defective units 
of the product or between allergic and non-allergic consumers. 
One possibility is that the market is accurately discounting these 
probabilities. The other is that it may not be - perhaps we have 
moved from an initial underestimation by consumers of the risk 
to a subsequent generalized overestimation in the market of these 
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risks (and the social costs attendant thereon). However, how this 
is known or can be discovered is not clear to me, given that no 
one seems to know even now what the precise probabilities are. 
Cohen seems to indicate a preference for confronting manufac- 
turers only with the "true" or  realized social costs of the product 
defect, presumably homeowners with demonstrated adverse 
health reactions who are compelled to remove the product. On 
this view, consumers with adverse reactions and unsafe products 
would be required to sort themselves, over time, from the larger 
pool of homeowners. 
I would argue, to the contrary, that market perceptions of the 
risks (and attendant social costs) may be the most efficient 
measure we have of these costs. Differentiating safe units of the 
product from unsafe units and "safe" consumers from "unsafe" 
consumers is likely to involve even greater social costs on the part 
of whoever undertakes the task, whether consumers, suppliers, 
the courts or  regulatory agencies - if not, someone would 
probably have done it, but no one has or  seems about to. Highly 
individualized court determinations of liability and measures of 
damage, given difficult problems of causation and quantification 
of health costs, would seem to involve higher administrative costs 
than generalized liability of manufacturers to all homeowners in 
the amount of the market depreciation of their homes. 
Moreover, Cohen's proposal, in an environment of legal uncer- 
tainty as to applicable liability rules, may significantly impair the 
liquidity of housing markets. For example, a homeowner who 
wants or  needs to move and whose house has been written down 
$20,000 by the market but who has not yet become sick, will 
either have to absorb this loss or avoid moving until he gets sick 
(which may be inconsistent with cost-conserving rationales under- 
lying conventional mitigation principles). A sub-buyer who 
subsequently gets sick will have been compensated ex ante by the 
reduction in the house price. Thus, no one may be able to recover 
for the loss. It is true that if liability on the part of manufacturers 
to both first and subsequent generations of homeowners who get 
sick is clear, this problem may not arise, as one would assume 
that sub-buyers (now guaranteed full compensation if they get 
sick) would no longer have any reason to discount house prices. 
Assuming away the possibility of market overestimation of the 
risks, the aggregate damages under my proposal should be the 
same as under Cohen's proposal, but with, it would seem, a 
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significant saving in transaction costs. This, of course, under- 
scores the artificiality of distinctions drawn in present tort law in 
some contexts between liability for personal injury and conse- 
quential economic losses and liability for so-called abstract 
economic loss.2 The latter may often be simply a cheaper way of 
calculating the former. The only difference in the effects of the 
alternative measures of damage may lie in the distributive 
impacts on individual homeowners. If the market, in writing 
down the value of houses with UFFI, is discounting significantly 
probabilities of defects and adverse reactions thereto, all 
homeowners will get their expected costs as damages whereas 
under Cohen's proposals some homeowners will get their actual 
costs (larger individual amounts in those cases). Risk averse 
consumers may prefer not to assume the risk of facing this 
difference between expected and actual costs. However, it is not 
clear that in the UFFI case the market valuations of houses 
containing UFFI are yielding significantly different measures of 
expected and actual costs. 
I conclude, therefore, that on deterrence grounds an optimal 
liability regime for manufacturers of UFFI is strict liability to all 
homeowners who have installed the insulation, with damages 
measured either in terms of actual or  anticipated repair costs or 
market depreciation in the value of their homes. A second-best 
regime, in deterrence terms, is a negligence regime which 
includes liability for economic losses. 
I believe that this general conclusion is reinforced by the 
insurance perspective. The losses at issue are substantial, 
uncommon, and unanticipated by most consumers. They are of a 
magnitude and a type that standard homeowners' insurance 
policies are addressed to (although not in this case apparently 
included, presumably because unperceived). The prevalence of 
homeowners' insurance for risks of this general magnitude and 
kind suggest that if homeowners who had purchased UFFI had 
accurately perceived the type of risks involved, they would have 
wanted to be insured against them. 
This, to my mind, leaves unresolved at the doctrinal level only 
the problem of retroactivity. It might be argued that for the 
courts to impose a strict liability regime, with liability for 
See the observations of Laskin C.J. in Rivtow Marine Lid. v. Washington Iron Works 
(1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530 at pp. 548 er seq., [I9741 S.C.R. 1189 at pp. 1216 et seq. 
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economic loss, on manufacturers in a mass damage situation, as 
in the UFFI case, would involve serious elements of non-marginal 
retroactivity which would deny manufacturers the opportunity for 
precautionary pricing and insurance adjustments that are central 
to the arguments for strict liability. There is some force to this 
argument. However, even under the present negligence regime, I 
would argue that expected costs (market depreciation) should be 
awarded to all homeowners as the cheapest way of estimating 
actual personal injury and consequential property losses (for 
which manufacturers are already liable). Thus, the present negli- 
gence regime should lead in the direction of the outcomes 
proposed in this Comment. 
One critical difference will remain between the two regimes: 
under negligence, the courts will have to determine whether the 
manufacturers took due care in designing and manufacturing 
their product; under strict liability this is unnecessary. Until we 
have such a regime in Canada, consumers and courts will be 
forced to struggle with complex technological issues largely 
beyond their competence. This is the ultimate civil liability 
problem, in my view, facing the homeowners in the UFFI case. In 
the further absence of sensible class action rules, the costs of 
satisfying the evidentiary requirements cannot easily be borne 
c~llectively.~ 
The final difficulty is a practical one. Do  the manufacturers 
have the resources to sustain the liability payments that may be 
entailed? If they do not, homeowners face an equally intractable 
set of difficulties in claiming against the government, either on 
account of negligence in the regulatory process or on broader 
grounds of public policy that might dictate that in some circum- 
stances governments should compensate losers from state action, 
whether or not negligence is i n ~ o l v e d . ~  All of this may be to 
suggest that the long-term lesson from the UFFI case is that much 
more effective regulatory processes are required with respect to 
many different forms of product-related or  occupationally-related 
health hazards so that UFFI-type cases arise less frequently in the 
future. Designing such processes is itself a formidable task, given 
-- 
3 See Donald N. Dewees, J .  Robert, S. Prichard, Michael J. Trebilcock, "An Economic 
Analysis of Cost and Fee Rules for Class Actions", 10 J. Legal Studies 155 (1981). 
See e.g., John Quinn and Michael J .  Trebilcock, "Compensation, Transition Costs and 
Regulatory Change", 32 U.T. L.J. 117 (1982). 
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the environment of scientific uncertainty and technological 
complexity in which the regulatory process here typically must 
  per ate.^ 
Comment on David Cohen's Paper: The Public and 
Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem 
Andrew J. Roman * 
Introduction 
The strongest message I get from Professor Cohen's paper is 
that the law in this area borders on chaos. The reasoning is 
circular, and the considerations taken into account so large in 
number and mutually contradictory as to preclude the discovery 
of any rational underlying principle. In short: a golden oppor- 
tunity for the advocate. 
The UFFI problem, when fed into this confusing matrix, 
provides an excellent lesson for the student of jurisprudence. 
There must be half a dozen or more principles under which the 
action could succeed, and probably an equal number under which 
it could fail. There is more than enough "law" to justify any 
conclusion. Hence, to me, the most important and interesting 
legal lessons to be learned are not in the substantive law (that is, 
in how to frame the cause of action) but in procedure and organi- 
zation. 
The FRESH Solution 
Through a referral from Professor Cohen, I was approached by 
a group of UFFI householders to explore the possibility of a class 
action. After a moment's reflection, it was obvious that a class 
action would be tactically inappropriate. None of the plaintiffs 
nor their lawyer would probably live long enough to survive the 
inevitable appeals of the motions to strike. In Canada there has 
yet to be a major class action to succeed at trial. Given the 
present climate of judicial hostility towards class actions and the 
* See e .g . ,  Carolyn J. Tuohy and Michael J. Trebilcock, Policy Options in the Regulation 
of Asbestos-Related Hazards, Study Series, Ontario Royal Commission on Asbestos 
(January, 1982). 
General Counsel, The Public Interest Research Centre, Toronto. These comments were 
delivered at the 12th Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law on October 
23,1982, and, except as otherwise indicated, they only speak to events as of this date. 
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rather heterogeneous nature of the UFFI class, I could see little 
chance of success even under the Quebec law or the reform 
proposed by the Ontario Law Reform Commission. 
However, even if a class action were permitted and could be 
undertaken expeditiously, it would create other problems. What 
individual class representative would have, and would risk, the 
amount of cash necessary (which I estimate at a minimum of 
$30,000) to obtain the expert evidence required to prove the 
necessary facts? What lawyer would risk perhaps an equal 
amount of his own money for a chance at a most uncertain costs 
award (even if contingent fees of the type recommended by the 
Ontario Law Reform Commission were allowed)? To put it 
simply, the UFFI litigation problem is not the law, but money. 
Clearly, only a group of UFFI victims, pooling their resources, 
can collect enough money to make the risk economically worth- 
while. Given damages probably in the range of $35,000 - $60,000 
per house, it is worth risking something to obtain redress; 
however, it cannot be worth risking as much or  more than the 
potential recovery. On the other hand, once a group of 
individuals decides to pool resources to make the legal action 
possible, why bring a class action to help all the "free riders" who 
contribute nothing? As a practical matter, no programme of 
fundraising for the action can succeed if one may obtain all of the 
benefits without any of the burdens. For all of these reasons, the 
only practical solution appeared to me to be a group action.' 
To provide a collection device and conduit for the money, a 
corporation called Foam Removal for Environmentally Safe 
Housing Inc. (FRESH) was created. It is now recruiting actively 
across Canada. Membership is obtained by submitting an appli- 
cation which includes a detailed questionnaire describing the 
precise nature of the damages to the house, and attaching 
estimates from qualified contractors for the removal of the foam 
and the restoration of the building or, if that is impossible, for the 
costs of its demolition and the purchase of another comparable 
home. This application form is required to be filled out carefully 
and to be sworn before a lawyer, notary, or commissioner.* An 
The group may have to be subdivided for purposes of litigation into two or more groups, 
depending on the common and different features of their claims. 
Thus the court will have before it not merely paper allegations but actual sworn evidence 
of damages. This can also reduce or eliminate the need for discoveries for many of the 
plaintiffs and streamline the process of proving damages. 
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initial contribution of $300 is also required. Further contributions 
may also be required, but all of the revenues collected will be 
held in trust and used only for the action. 
To ensure that I am not swamped with dozens of phone calls 
and letters from prospective members, as counsel to FRESH I 
will be taking my instructions initially from one person. Once the 
action is under way, that will change. The officers of FRESH will 
be required to report regularly to the membership, and to convey 
to the members, at my request, such information about the action 
or offers to settle as may be relevant. This is to protect the 
members from the danger of the defendant "buying off'  the 
leadership of FRESH with special offers in return for instructing 
me to settle at a rate that is unfair to the other members. Also, 
settlement will be on a basis of percentage of all claims, rather 
than a fixed dollar amount per house. This avoids the creation of 
conflicts of interest between members of the group with widely 
differing damage claims. 
The foregoing is only a short description of FRESH, although I 
will be happy to expand on it if there is time during discussion. I 
would be the first to agree, however, that FRESH is not for every 
UFFI householder. We cannot provide a Rolls Royce level of 
client service at a Lada price. Undoubtedly, if an individual 
plaintiff can afford the costs of lawyers and expert witnesses on 
his own, he would get much more attentive and individualized 
service from his own lawyer. Similarly, there may still be a few 
people naive enough to believe that a suit is unnecessary as there 
may be a successful political solution to their problem if they wait 
long enough. (All that this requires is half a dozen federal 
government departments and agencies to announce publicly that 
they were negligent, and to make voluntary compensation 
payments for a total of approximately ll/z billion dollars to all of 
the victims. This veritable orgy of political humility will be 
achieved, it is hoped, by the seductive negotiating skills of the 
federal government's National Advisory Council on UFFI.) 
Professor Cohen describes the apparent function of the 
Advisory Council as being "to represent the interests of 
unorganized homeowners in negotiations concerning the 
substance of the compensation pr~gramme".~ From what I hear, 
the government's treatment of the Advisory Council has become 
3 Supra, p. 435. 
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something of a joke. Its members have no organizational 
cohesiveness and nothing in common other than the fact that they 
have formaldehyde in their homes. They have very little commu- 
nication outside of official meetings, when they are flown to 
Ottawa by their negotiating "adversaries" and brought into a 
room where they are confronted by an organized team of skilled 
and experienced bureaucrats. The legal skills which have been 
retained to assist the Council are those of the government, and 
not made available independently to the  homeowner^.^ So far, if 
one looks at what the Council has accomplished, the meeting 
agendas suggest that apart from some minor administrative 
improvements in a statute which offers a maximum of $5,000 
compensation (and then only after all of the cost of removal has 
been paid by the owner), the homeowners have nothing to show 
for all their effort over almost a year. Rather, the government has 
been successful in diverting, and perhaps even co-opting such 
precarious indigenous leadership as the UFFI problem in its early 
stages was able to create. If the members of these UFFI groups 
realized that their membership dues had accomplished so little, 
while so much time has been allowed to pass, they would no 
doubt be concerned. I agree with Professor Cohen that the 
apparent absence of leverage available to the homeowners' 
associations in the political forum makes it clear that the legal 
route is the only route to meaningful redress for what is 
undoubtedly the largest and most serious single consumer 
problem of the decade. 
It is no longer particularly enlightening to describe the UFFI 
problem, as Professor Cohen does, as a "political problem". 
Whose political problem is it? The government has already put its 
final offer on the table through the Urea Formaldehyde 
Insulation Act and its Regulations. After a year of so-called 
negotiations, not an extra dollar has been offered. Professor 
Cohen suggests that the only satisfactory solution may be a 
decision-making body with authority to award compensation, but 
he neglects to tell us who would create such a body. Obviously, it 
could only be the government, through legislation. But why 
should the government do this? Its urea formaldehyde problem 
has been solved. The next step is up to the homeowners. 
While litigation is admittedly a slow and uncertain route to 
However, I understand that as a result of Professor Cohen's efforts the services of a pro 
bono public0 lawyer were made available to the Committee. 
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compensation, it is at least preferable to passive acceptance of the 
certainty that there will be no more voluntary compensation 
forthcoming from the government. 
The homeowners' UFFI problem can best be solved, in my 
view, through a group action in the Federal Court of Canada 
against the Federal Crown and several Crown agencies. 
Conclusion 
It seems to me that the UFFI challenge is primarily one of 
procedure or organization, and of funding; it is not primarily legal 
in the substantive sense. This is not to say that there will not be 
difficult and complex substantive legal questions to resolve. 
However, the techniques for resolving them are well established. 
We must research and analyse all of the existing and emerging 
legal doctrines, the statutes and the case law -compulsively. We 
must use all our advocacy skills to distinguish the cases which 
seem to run against us, while supporting those which favour our 
argument. And, of course, we must retain and work collabora- 
tively with the best expert witnesses we can find. None of this, 
however, is truly new. 
On the other hand, the initiation and development of a group 
action is not well known. I could not find any law books 
explaining how to set up the membership in a group action, or  
how to prepare my own retainer so as to  be fair to all of the 
divergent interests in the group. 
Let me conclude with a substantive point. In an age when big 
government has in some areas supplanted the principle of caveat 
emptor with a statutorily created government warning system 
under the Hazardous Products Act,5 and has held itself out as the 
expert in product safety, it is understandable that the public will 
rely on these representations. This is particularly true when the 
government publicizes the fact that it will provide grants to install 
insulation which meets government-set standards, including 
UFFI. Unfortunately, even programmes designed with the best 
of intentions to help the consumer can, if carried out wrongly, 
damage consumers on an unprecedented scale. 
5 R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3, as amended. 
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